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INTRODUCTION 
The London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is often called the 
world’s “most important number,” and is the most commonly indexed 
interest rate in the world.1  In 2008, the combined gross domestic 
product of the world’s economy was estimated at $60 trillion.2  Yet, due 
to leverage, approximately $360 trillion in swaps and $10 trillion in 
loans were indexed to LIBOR.3  Currently, most of the swap market and 
70% of the U.S. futures market reference LIBOR.4  The Economist 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Nick Summers, The UBS Libor-Fraud E-mails Are a Gift for Regulators, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/ 
2012-12-19/the-ubs-libor-fraud-emails-are-a-gift-for-regulators. 
 2. See GDP, WORLD BANK GRP., http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?display=graph. 
 3. See Simone Foxman, How Barclays Made Money on LIBOR Manipulation, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 10, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-barclays-made-
money-on-libor-manipulation-2012-7.  In swaps, the notional amount does not change 
hands, which allows investors exposure to a benchmark without having to tie up 
significant capital. See infra note 284. 
 4. See Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler at London City Week on Benchmark 
Interest Rates, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2013), 
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recently estimated that approximately $800 trillion worth of financial 
instruments are tied to LIBOR.5 
LIBOR measures the rate it costs banks to borrow money from 
each other for a short period of time.6  Every day numerous banks are 
contacted and asked how much it costs to borrow short-term funds.7  
The banks’ answers are then averaged to calculate that day’s LIBOR.8 
From August 2005 until at least 2009, numerous banks and broker-
dealers routinely falsified or colluded to falsify LIBOR submissions.9  
As of October 2013, three investment banks and one broker-dealer 
admitted wrongdoing, and authorities have subpoenaed eleven other 
banks.10  One leading academic testified before Congress that the 
LIBOR scandal is the largest financial scam in recorded history.11 
On May 20, 2008, the New York Federal Reserve (“N.Y. Fed”), 
under the leadership of Timothy Geithner, claimed to have heard from 
several Eurodollar brokers about suspicious LIBOR submissions. 12  
Banks claimed to submit to the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”) 
the rate at which they can borrow funds.13  But according to the dealers, 
banks were in practice bidding on the open market an additional 25 basis 
points above their BBA submissions.14  Geithner claims he informed the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-140 [hereinafter 
CFTC, Gensler Remarks]. 
 5. See The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281. 
 6. See BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA 
LIBOR—STRENGTHENING FOR HE FUTURE § 3.3 (2008) [hereinafter BBA REPORT]. 
 7. See infra notes 36–55 and accompanying text. 
 8. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6 at 1. 
 9. See infra Part I; see also Douglas Keenan, My Thwarted Attempt to Tell of 
Libor Shenanigans, FIN. TIMES (July 26, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms 
/s/0/dc5f49c2-d67b-11e1-ba60-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2GxizaQGl  (claiming LIBOR 
manipulation was known amongst bankers as early as 1991). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 15 (2012) (statement of Andrew Lo, 
Professor, MIT) (“This LIBOR fixing scandal dwarfs by orders of magnitude any 
financial scam in the history of [the] markets.”). 
 12. See SAMUEL CHEUN & MATT RASKIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., RECENT 
CONCERNS REGARDING LIBOR’S CREDIBILITY (2008). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and Bank of 
England of the false submissions.15  Yet the manipulations continued, 
and the only timely result was that the BBA published a report 
evaluating LIBOR.16 
In 2012, after various news reports surfaced claiming that banks 
were deliberately manipulating LIBOR rates, U.K. regulators launched 
an investigation into how to reform LIBOR.17  The investigation 
concluded and published its results and recommendations in The 
Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report.18  Then Secretary of the 
Treasury, Geithner announced that U.S. regulators would not rely on 
U.K. regulators to solve LIBOR’s problems.19  The House Financial 
Services Committee, however, doubted Geithner’s claim and openly 
questioned the appropriateness of Geithner’s previous attempts to 
reform LIBOR.20 
Many commentators have called for LIBOR reform.21  Most of 
these commentators have suggested that LIBOR should be based upon 
actual transactions.22  Due to Basel III requirements, however, many 
banks have recently stopped lending unsecured funds to other banks.23  
                                                                                                                 
 15. See The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 10 (2012) (statement of Timothy 
Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury). 
 16. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6. 
 17. See MARTIN WHEATLEY ET AL., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL 
REPORT (2012) [hereinafter WHEATLEY REVIEW]. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Richard Blackden, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Warns Libor 
Reform Won’t Be Left ‘to the British’, THE TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9410557/US-
Treasury-Secretary-Tim-Geithner-warns-Libor-reform-wont-be-left-to-the-British.html; 
see also Press Release, CNBC, Transcript of Timothy Geithner Interview (July 19, 
2012), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/48197285. 
 20. See The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing 
Before The H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 10 (2012). 
 21. See infra Part II.  But see Lucy McNulty, Barclays Rate-Fixing Scandal: Libor 
Alternatives Analysed, INT’L FIN. REV. (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3058468/Regulatory/Barclays-rate-fixing-scandal-Libor-
alternatives-analysed.html (showing the results of a pool where only 19% or 
respondents favored abolishing Libor.) 
 22. See, e.g., Rebecca Tabb & Joseph Grundfest, Alternatives to LIBOR, 8 CAPITAL 
MKTS. L.J. 229 (2013); Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limb: A Call for More Reform, 13 
N.C. BANKING INST. 365, 381 (2009). 
 23. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
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Some bankers have even suggested that they may never again lend 
unsecured funds to other banks for tenors longer than 30 days.24 
Due to the difficulties in reforming LIBOR, U.K. regulators and 
many academics are debating using an alternative to LIBOR for 
measuring interbank loans.25  Most of these commentators focus on OIS 
swaps, repo rates, Treasury notes, and committed quotes.26  This 
Comment proposes a new LIBOR alternative based upon the CFTC’s 
swap clearing house requirements.27 
Under 17 C.F.R. § 50, the CFTC has promulgated that FX and 
fixed-to-variable rate swaps must be executed through a clearinghouse.28  
A similar rule can be enacted for inter-bank loans.  Effectively, U.S. 
banks currently use the Federal Reserve System as a clearinghouse for 
overnight loans.  It would be relatively simple to create a clearinghouse 
for loans with longer terms .29 
Alternatively, banks can be required to lend funds through an 
exchange.30  In a recent article, Rebecca Tabb and former SEC 
commissioner Joseph Grundfest suggested such an approach.31  Tabb 
and Grundfest’s proposal, however, fails to account for differences 
amongst banks’ creditworthiness.32  Unlike swaps, which are notional 
contracts, LIBOR loans are direct loans that reflect a bank’s 
creditworthiness.33  Forcing banks to lend on an exchange would be the 
equivalent of forcing banks to lend to less creditworthy peers.34  Banks 
would then have to raise rates in order to account for the additional risk 
premium.35  This Comment attempts to avoid the credit premium 
problem by proposing an inter-banking rating system where banks 
participating in the exchange only lend to other banks that have an open 
line of credit with the lending bank. 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See id. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra notes 269–307 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See 17 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(2) (2013). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 22, at 255. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See LAURENCE MUTKIN & ELAINE LIN, MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH, 
INTEREST RATE STRATEGY, WHAT FUTURE FOR LIBOR? (2012). 
 33. See infra notes 284–286. 
 34. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32. 
 35. See id. 
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Part I of this Comment will introduce the reader to LIBOR, explain 
how it is calculated, and show the reader why it is important.  Part I will 
then proceed to show the reader how banks and broker dealers 
manipulated LIBOR, and explain the effects of the manipulations.  Part 
II will summarize and analyze the two main reviews of LIBOR: the 
BBA’s 2008 review and the 2012 Wheatley Review.  Part II will then 
examine how a fair and accurate benchmark is created.  Additionally, 
Part II will explain some of the most commonly cited LIBOR 
alternatives.  Finally, Part III will introduce, analyze, and discuss the 
viability of LIBOR alternatives not mentioned in Part II. 
I.  WHAT IS LIBOR AND WHAT WENT WRONG 
Part I of this Comment will introduce the reader to LIBOR and 
explain how it is calculated and regulated.  Part I will then explain why 
LIBOR is important.  Finally, Part I will show how the financial 
industry manipulated LIBOR and describe the responses of U.K. and 
U.S regulators. 
A. CALCULATING LIBOR 
Modern day BBA36 LIBOR was created in 198537 and tracks the 
rate at which banks can borrow short-term funds from each other in 
London at 11 a.m.38  Prior to 2013, BBA LIBOR tracked U.S. Dollars39 
(USD LIBOR) and nine other currencies40 in 15 tenors, or maturities.41  
In total, there were 150 daily LIBOR rates.42 
                                                                                                                 
 36. The BBA is a not-for-profit industry trade group that regularly advocated for its 
members, including banks on its LIBOR panels. See David Enrich & Max Colchester, 
Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of Libor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578119151811254648.htm
l. 
 37. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 2.3. 
 38. See id. § 3.1. 
 39. USD LIBOR does not track U.S. Dollars, rather, USD LIBOR tracks 
Eurodollars. See id. § 3.3.  U.S. Dollar is defined as a United States Dollar in the United 
States.  Eurodollars is defined as the United States Dollar outside of the U.S.  
Accordingly, because LIBOR tracks U.S. dollars in London, USD LIBOR tracks 
Eurodollars. See TIMOTHY Q. COOK & ROBERT K. LAROCHE, FED. RESERVE BANK FOR 
RICHMOND, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, 48–51 (7th ed. 1993). 
 40. The Pound Sterling (GPB), U.S. Dollar (USD), Japanese Yen (JPY), Swiss 
Franc (CHF), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Australian Dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), Danish 
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To calculate these rates, the BBA created a “panel” of banks for 
each currency.43  Depending on the currency, the number of banks on 
each panel ranged from six to 18.44  Participation in panels was 
voluntary,45 but the BBA claimed that all significant London traders 
participated in their respective LIBOR panels, and panel participants 
contributed to most of the inter-bank lending in London.46 
Every day, panel banks reported to the BBA their estimate 
regarding what rate they could borrow funds in their panel’s currency 
for the 15 tenors LIBOR tracked.47  The BBA then excluded the top 25% 
and bottom 25% of the reported rates, and averaged the remaining 
50%.48  This weighted average then became the LIBOR rate for the 
panel’s currency.49  The BBA repeated this process for all of the 
currencies, and reported their conclusion to Thomas Reuters who 
published all of the rates at 11 a.m. London time.50 
The rates that banks reported were not the rates at which they 
actually borrowed money.51  Very often, amongst the 150 LIBOR rates, 
no actual trades took place.52  Rather, the reported rates were just the 
banks’ estimates regarding what rate they could borrow should they 
desire to obtain funds.53  Similarly, BBA LIBOR did not attempt to 
measure how much it cost banks to borrow funds in a currency’s home 
                                                                                                                 
Kroner (DKK), Swedish Krona (SEK) and New Zealand Dollar (NZD). See BBA 
REPORT, supra note 6, § 3.4. 
 41. Overnight, one week (1W), two week (2W), one month (1Mo) and every 
month afterwards until 12 months (12Mo). See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, at 
Chart 6.13. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. § 5.20.  The USD panel includes in part the Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi, Barclays Bank plc, Deutsche Bank AG HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds, TSB Bank 
plc, Rabobank and the Royal Bank of Canada. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. § 3.1. 
 46. See id. § 8.3. 
 47. See id. § 12.2. 
 48. See id. § 10.1. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. § 3.3.  The BBA notes that not every bank is willing to lend to every 
other bank and that these rates generally only available to other banks that have open 
lines of credit. See id. § 6.10. 
 51. See id. § 12.2. 
 52. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, at Chart 4.A. 
 53. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2. 
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country.54  Rather, BBA LIBOR attempted to measure how much it 
costs banks to borrow in London.55 
B. LIBOR’S IMPORTANCE 
In 2008, almost all subprime adjustable rate mortgages in the 
United States56 and approximately 50% of all private student loans in the 
United States were linked to LIBOR.57  As of May 2012, almost 45% of 
prime adjustable rate mortgages and close to 80% of subprime 
adjustable rate mortgages were linked to LIBOR.58  A minor difference 
in LIBOR, such as 0.3 percentage points, can result in a $100 increase in 
the monthly payment on a $500,000 adjustable rate mortgage.59  
Moreover, approximately $9 trillion dollars in corporate debt was linked 
to LIBOR.60  According to one estimate, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
lost $3 billion due to the LIBOR scandal.61 
LIBOR use is not limited to the private sector; governments also 
used LIBOR.62  The U.S. government used LIBOR when bailing out 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See id. §§ 7.1–7.6. 
 55. See id. § 3.1.  The BBA acknowledges that there are banks that are not included 
in LIBOR panels because they do participate in the London money market. See id. §§ 
8.3–8.4. 
 56. See Guhan Venkatu, How Many U.S. Mortgages Are Linked to Libor?, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0712/01banfin.cfm. 
 57. Ben Levisohn & Lauren Young, The Lowdown on Libor, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, May 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-05-28/the-lowdown-on-libor. 
 58. See Venkatu, supra note 56. 
 59. See Sara Munez, The Libor Investigation: How Libor Affects Rates on Loans, 
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2012, at A5. 
 60. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Laurence Norman & James R. Hagerty, 
Libor’s Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120856108868827857. 
 61. See Clea Benson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Libor Loss Tops $3 Billion in 
Audit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-
19/fannie-mae-freddie-mac-libor-loss-tops-3-billion-auditor-says.html. 
 62. See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion: 
Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
09/rigged-libor-hits-states-localities-with-6-billion-muni-credit.html. 
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AIG in its Toxic Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)63 and at least five 
states may have used LIBOR in connection with their pension funds.64  
One expert estimated that approximately 75% of major cities have 
outstanding contracts with ties to LIBOR.65 
C. HOW LIBOR WAS MANIPULATED 
Starting in the middle of 2005, Barclays, a major British bank, 
made numerous false LIBOR submissions to the BBA.66  Barclays 
raised and lowered its reported LIBOR rates for two reasons.  First, 
Barclays did not want to appear less creditworthy than its peers.67  
Second, Barclays wanted to generate profits for its derivate 
department.68 
A difference of 1 basis point in LIBOR can result in several million 
dollars of profit for a major bank.69  To capitalize on these minor 
differences, Barclays’s derivative department regularly dictated to the 
bank’s cash department what LIBOR rate the bank should report.70  At 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 174–77 (2012). 
 64. See David McLaughlin, Libor Manipulation Probed by Five State Legal 
Offices, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
16/libor-manipulation-investigated-by-new-york-connecticut.html; Nathaniel Popper, 
Banks Face Suits as States Weigh Libor Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/business/banks-facing-suits-as-states-weigh-their-
libor-losses.html?_r=1&#038;ref=business. 
 65. See Nathaniel Popper, Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, July 10, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/libor-rate-rigging-
scandal-sets-off-legal-fights-for-restitution. 
 66. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
 67. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBOR: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5  (2012). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Philip Thomas, Libor Lessons, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, 
http://www.ftadviser.com/2013/10/09/investments/economic-indicators/libor-lessons.-
oVUsJze4WmgSz1L8m763SK/article-1.html. 
 70. For example, traders sent emails saying “[w]e have another big fixing 
tom[orrow] and with the market more I was hoping we could set 1M and 3M Libors as 
high as possible,” or “Pls ask [submitter] to get 1m set to 82.”  The submitters 
frequently responded with responses such as “leave it with me Sir,” or “done . . . for 
you big boy.” See In re Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330, at 
*8–9 (June 27, 2012). 
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this point, Barclays did not even prevent its derivative traders and rate 
submitters from communicating with each other.71 
UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), and Dutch Rabobank also 
manipulated LIBOR for their own profit.72  In an apparent lack of 
oversight, UBS made its derivative traders in charge of submitting 
LIBOR quotes.73  One senior trader at UBS then developed relationships 
with employees at four other banks in order to coordinate false LIBOR 
submissions.74  In total, UBS traders made approximately 2,000 requests 
to manipulate LIBOR.75 
To further perpetuate the fraud, UBS asked broker-dealers to 
disseminate false LIBOR information amongst banks.76  UBS then 
rewarded these broker dealers by executing wash-trades, or trades that 
have no purpose other than to generate fees for the broker.77 
D. EARLY WARNINGS SIGNS AND RESPONSES TO LIBOR BEING 
MANIPULATED 
There were many potential warnings of LIBOR fraud.78  Towards 
the end of 2007, Barclays reported to the BBA that some panel banks 
were submitting rates that were far below market conditions.79  On May 
20, 2008, the N.Y. Fed privately claimed to have heard from several 
Eurodollar brokers that banks were bidding for funds on the open 
market up to 25 basis points above the rates they submitted to the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255 [hereinafter BBC, Timeline]. 
 72. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
 73. See In re UBS AG, CFTC Docket No. 13-09, 2012 WL 6642376, at *5–6 (Dec. 
19, 2012). 
 74. For instance, one trader asked “strange request [I] know but can we go for a 
high 6m fix but a low 7m fix pls.”  Another trader asked “[c]an we pls go for lower 
Libors tonight, across all tenors (1m 3m and 6m) much appreciated.”  The submitter 
responded “[w]ill do.” See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id., at *2. 
 77. See id. at *27–29. 
 78. See infra notes 79–84. 
 79. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
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BBA.80  A week later, the Wall Street Journal published an article 
questioning LIBOR’s accuracy.81 
According to Geithner, the Bank of England,82 SEC, and CFTC 
were informed about potentially false LIBOR submission in 2008.83  
Soon after, numerous academic studies were published attempting to 
determine if banks were falsifying their submissions.84  It appears, 
however, that only the CFTC seriously looked into allegations of false 
LIBOR submissions and, despite an ongoing and open investigation into 
UBS, the CFTC only discovered the false submissions after UBS 
launched its own internal investigation.85 
Partially in response to media claims of LIBOR being manipulated, 
on June 10, 2008, the BBA published a comprehensive report analyzing 
LIBOR and how to create a more accurate benchmark.86  The BBA 
added a scrutiny mechanism and other minor changes to LIBOR.87  
Then, on November 2, 2009, the BBA circulated guidelines for 
submitting LIBOR rates.88  Unfortunately, approximately a month later 
when Barclays began to improve its own internal LIBOR controls, it 
ignored the BBA’s guidelines.89 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See CHEUN & RASKIN, supra note 12. 
 81. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate WSJ Analysis 
Suggests Banks May Have Reported Flawed Interest Data for Libor, WALL ST. J., May 
29, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB121200703762027135. 
 82. See E-mail from Timothy Geitner to Mervyn King (June 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libor/June_1_2008_LIBO
R_recommendations.pdf. 
 83. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
 84. See, e.g., Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert D. Metz & Gim S. 
Seow, Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 136 (2012) 
 85. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
 86. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6.  The BBA subsequently published an 
Understanding LIBOR paper in 2010 and 2012. See BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR (2010); BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR (2012).  However, these reports were 
not comprehensive and did not fully analyze LIBOR. 
 87. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 13.3. 
 88. See BBC, Timeline, supra note 71. 
 89. See id. 
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E. RESULTS OF LIBOR MANIPULATIONS 
On June 27, 2012, the CFTC ordered Barclays to pay a $200 
million penalty.90  In addition, the Justice Department fined Barclays 
$160 million, and the FSA91 fined Barclays £59.5 million.92  Similarly, 
UBS and RBS paid approximately $1.5 billion and $612 million, 
respectively, in restitution to regulators.93  ICAP, the largest 
international broker dealer, agreed to pay approximately $87 million in 
fines for helping banks coordinate false submissions.94 
On July 31, 2012, Deutsche Bank admitted that some of its staff 
members had engaged in LIBOR rigging.95  As of September 2012, 19 
banks worldwide were under investigation for manipulating LIBOR 
rates.96  Recently, in conjunction with other regulators, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty 
for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor 
Benchmark Interest Rates (July 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12 [hereinafter CFTC, Barclays 
Penalty]. 
 91. The Financial Service Authority (“FSA”) is an independent U.K. non-
governmental body given statutory powers by the U.K. Financial Services and Markets 
Act of 2000, and which regulates most financial services markets, exchanges and firms 
in the U.K.  FSA is funded by the firms it regulates and is accountable to U.K. Treasury 
Ministers and Parliament. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8 (Eng.). 
 92. See CFTC, Barclays Penalty, supra note 90. 
 93. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead 
Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark 
Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1522.html; Press Release, CFTC, 
CFTC Orders UBS to Pay $700 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation, 
Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting of LIBOR and Other Benchmark Interest 
Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/ 
pr6472-12; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to 
Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark 
Interest Rates (Feb. 16, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/ 
February/13-crm-161.html. 
 94. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges ICAP Europe Limited, a Subsidiary 
of ICAP plc, with Manipulation and Attempted Manipulation of Yen Libor (Sept. 25, 
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6708-13. 
 95. See BBC, Timeline, supra note 71. 
 96. See Enrich & Colchester, supra note 36. 
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Department of Justice fined Dutch Rabobank approximately $1 billion 
dollars for 500 attempts to manipulating LIBOR.97 
On December 12, 2012, the BBA announced that pursuant to the 
Wheatley Review, it was abolishing most LIBOR rates.98  Starting in 
May 2013, instead of collecting 150 LIBOR rates, the BBA would only 
collect 37 rates.99  Similarly, the BBA announced that it agreed to 
suggestion number 3 of the Wheatley Review and it would sell 
LIBOR.100  On July 9, 2013, after an auction with the London Stock 
Exchange Group and Thomson Reuters, NYSE EuroNext purchased 
LIBOR for $1.101  It is expected that NYSE EuroNext will fully take 
over LIBOR in early 2014.102  
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: THE BBA REPORT, WHEATLEY REVIEW, 
AND LIBOR ALTERNATIVES 
In 2008, after allegations of LIBOR rigging first surfaced, the BBA 
launched a comprehensive review of the benchmark.103  Similarly, in 
response to the Barclays scandal, U.K. regulators launched a 
comprehensive investigation into LIBOR.104  The investigation was 
headed by Martin Wheatley and eventually published as The Wheatley 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See Dutch Rabobank Fined $1 Bbillion Over Libor Scandal, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-rabobank-libor-id 
USBRE99S0L520131029. 
 98. See BBA, STRENGTHENING LIBOR—PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT 
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 6 OF ‘THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR’ (2012), 
available at http://www.bba.org.uk/downloads/bba/Streamline_Consultation.pdf 
[hereinafter BBA, STRENGTHENING LIBOR]. 
 99. The tenors are EUR same day 1wk and 1m, the USD, CHF, EUR, GBP,JPY in 
the overnight, 1wk, 1m, 2m, 3m, 6m and 12m tenors. See id.  However, the Wheatley 
Review called for the abolishment of 130 LIBOR rates and the BBA announced that it 
plans to abolish only 108 rates. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17. 
 100. See Press Release, BBA, BBA Statement on Wheatley Review of LIBOR 
(Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-statement-
on-wheatley-review-of-libor. 
 101. Brooke Master & Philip Stafford, Scandal-Plagued Libor Moves to NYSE, FIN. 
TIMES, July 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/73332222-e87f-11e2-aead-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2iw85Hm61. 
 102. See Press Release, NYSE EuroNext, NYSE EuroNext Subsidiary to Become 
New Administrator of LIBOR (July 9, 2013), available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
press/1373365567815.html. 
 103. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6. 
 104. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §1.3. 
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Review of LIBOR: Final Report.105  The Wheatley investigation team 
considered abolishing LIBOR and using an alternative benchmark.106  
Ultimately, however, the Wheatley Review decided not to abandon 
LIBOR.107  Other regulators disagreed and many other commentators are 
attempting to find LIBOR substitutes.108 
Part II of this Comment will first explain the BBA Report and the 
Wheatley Review.  Part II will then analyze and explain the 
characteristics of a fair and accurate benchmark.  Finally, Part II will 
evaluate some of the commonly proposed alternatives to LIBOR. 
A. THE BBA REPORT 
On June 10, 2008, the BBA published a report analyzing LIBOR.109  
The report reviewed LIBOR and addressed claims that banks were 
rigging the benchmark.110  The BBA’s report also affirmed its 
commitment to several key characteristics of LIBOR.111 
1. How LIBOR Is Calculated 
The BBA Report affirmed its commitment to how LIBOR is 
calculated.112  LIBOR is defined as “the rate at which an individual 
contributor panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking 
for and the accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just 
prior to 11.00 London time.”113  The BBA rejected two possible 
changes, detailed below.114 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See id. 
 106. See infra notes 196–199. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Kevin Costelloe, Bernanke Says Alternatives to Libor Being Considered, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-25/bernanke-
says-alternatives-to-libor-being-considered.html. 
 109. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See infra notes 112–129 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra notes 115–122 and accompanying text. 
 113. BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2. 
 114. See infra notes 115–121 and accompanying text. 
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a. Prime Versus Actual Bank 
Prior to 1998, banks were asked to provide the rate at which a 
“prime bank” would lend to another prime bank.115  This definition, 
however, led to confusion as to which banks are defined as “prime 
banks.”116  Therefore, in 1998, the BBA changed LIBOR to its current 
definition which asks panel banks to estimate their own costs of 
borrowing—not those of a hypothetical prime bank.117  This was 
intended to create a more accurate LIBOR by reflecting the true cost of 
borrowing funds.118 
b. Reasonable Market Size 
In addition, the BBA refused to define reasonable market size.119  
For LIBOR submissions, banks are asked to calculate rates based upon a 
loan of “reasonable market size.”120  Since different currencies and 
tenors have wide ranges of liquidity, the BBA felt that no set 
denomination could accurately define reasonable market size amongst 
all 150 LIBOR rates.121  Therefore, the BBA deliberately let each bank 
independently determine what amounts to reasonable market size.122 
2. Transparency 
Each individual bank’s rate is published alongside the overall 
LIBOR average.123  The BBA acknowledged that if a bank publishes a 
rate that is higher than its peers, market participants may perceive the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. § 12.3. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. Economics dictate that lending a larger sum of money is a greater risk 
then lending a smaller sum of money.  Accordingly, the cost of borrowing also reflects 
the amount of funds borrowed.  By not specifying the amount of funds borrowed, 
LIBOR fails to take this into account. See Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, 
A Comparison of Libor to Other Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs 8 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, 2012).  
 123. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 11.1. 
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banks with the higher rate as having a shortage of funds.124  As a result, 
to avoid this perception, banks have an incentive to misreport their costs 
of borrowing and exhibit “herd behavior.”125 
In reality, there may be a number of valid explanations that have 
nothing to do with a shortage of funds and explain why a bank is willing 
to pay more than its peers for credit.126  For example, the borrowing 
bank may be a foreign bank and have less natural access to the 
underlying currency through deposits.127  This requires the bank to 
borrow in the inter-bank market to obtain the desired currency.128 
To minimize banks incentive to misreport and appear weak, the 
BBA considered hiding individual banks’ submissions and only 
publishing the overall LIBOR rate.129  Ultimately, however, the BBA 
rejected this proposal.130  In the interests of promoting transparency, the 
BBA in its 2008 report decided to continue its policy of releasing 
individual bank data.131 
3. Accuracy of LIBOR 
The BBA recognized that not every bank can borrow funds at the 
posted LIBOR rate.132  Banks will generally only lend to another bank if 
the borrowing bank has an open line of credit with the lending 
institution.133  If a borrowing bank does not have an open line of credit 
with the lender, the borrowing bank may not be able to borrow funds or 
only be able to borrow funds at a higher rate.134  This reflects the BBA’s 
opinion that LIBOR panels are composed of the most credit-worthy 
banks.135 
The BBA report further noted that LIBOR reflects the rate it costs 
banks to borrow in an underlying currency, without any references to 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See id. 
 125. Banks look at other banks before submitting quotes. See id. 
 126. See Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra, note 122, at 7. 
 127. See id.; see also John C. Hull & Alan White, LIBOR vs. OIS:  The Derivatives 
Discounting Dilemma, 11 J. INV. MGMT. 3, 16 (2013). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 11.1. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. § 6.10. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See BBA REPORT, at 1. 
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other currency.136  This can lead to market distortions.137  A bank can 
borrow U.S. dollars at the USD LIBOR rate and then convert its dollars 
on the Foreign Exchange (“FX”)138 market to Euros.139  The resulting 
Euros may be cheaper than the corresponding EUR LIBOR.140  
Conversely, banks wishing to lend out Euros and obtain U.S. dollars 
may have to pay more than the EUR LIBOR rate.141 
4. Safeguards Against Fraud 
The BBA seemed to rely primarily on three mechanisms to prevent 
fraud: (1) separating banks’ cash from derivative departments; (2) 
expanding LIBOR panels; and (3) scrutiny mechanisms.142  Ultimately, 
each of these mechanisms failed.143 
a. Separation of Departments 
To avoid fraudulent submissions, the BBA report claimed that 
panel banks’ quotes should come from their cash department, not their 
derivative department.144  Furthermore, the two departments should be 
prevented from communicating with a “Chinese wall.”145  Most likely, 
the intent of the proposal was to prevent derivative traders, who would 
benefit from manipulating LIBOR rates, from engaging in the bank’s 
LIBOR submission process. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See id. §§ 7.1–7.6. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Foreign Exchange markets are where currencies are traded. See MARC 
LEVINSON, THE ECONOMIST—GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS 14–16 (4th ed. 2006). 
 139. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 7.1–7.6. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See infra notes 144–153 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 66–102 and accompanying text. 
 144. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2. 
 145. See id. 
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b. Expansion of Contributing Panel 
The BBA stated that panel banks were good representations of the 
London market and no new banks wished to join the panels.146  
Moreover, the BBA claimed that LIBOR participants make up most of 
the trading in London147 and all significant London traders participated 
in their respective LIBOR panels.148  The BBA report did, however, 
consider adding non-contributing banks to the panel.149 
c. Scrutiny Mechanism 
The BBA also developed a “scrutiny mechanism” to ensure 
LIBOR’s accuracy.150  The BBA designed this mechanism to check 
banks’ daily submissions for discrepancies.151  If a discrepancy is 
noticed, the submitting bank is given the opportunity to provide an 
explanation.152  In the event a bank is unable to give an adequate 
explanation, the banks receive a warning and repeat offenders are 
removed from the panel.153 
5. Limits of the BBA Report 
The BBA report was well intended; however, it had some 
limitations.154  Notably, LIBOR was still based on estimates—not real 
trades.155  In addition, the BBA also had no legal authority to prevent 
frauds.156 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See id. § 13.3.  At the time of the BBA report there were only 16 banks on the 
USD LIBOR panel. Currently, there are 18 banks on the panel. Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, 
supra note 122, at 5. 
 147. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 8.4. 
 148. See id. § 3.1. 
 149. See id. § 13.3. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. §§ 7.1–7.6. 
 154. See infra notes 156–167 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Wong, supra note 22, at 379. 
 156. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32. 
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a. Basing LIBOR on Real Transactions 
After the BBA report, the BBA continued to base LIBOR rates 
upon contributing banks’ estimates, not actual borrowing rates.157  Panel 
banks submit LIBOR rates up to the fifth decimal point.158  In practice, 
trades are quoted and executed to the third or fourth decimal point.159  
By not basing submissions on actual trade data, banks can strategically 
misreport rates.160 
Basing LIBOR on actual trades would result in a more accurate and 
transparent rate.161  When an actual trade takes place, there is a 
counterparty that can verify the price paid.162  The overall LIBOR can 
then be weighted to accommodate for different volumes of trades.163 
However, there is a problem with basing LIBOR on actual 
transactions.164  Many of the 150 LIBOR rates have low or no amounts 
of daily trading.165  It is difficult to base submissions on real trades when 
very little trades are actually taking place.166  This might result in banks 
being unable to give accurate LIBOR quotes.167  Moreover, due to the 
very little trading, one large trade by a single market participant can 
significantly affect the overall LIBOR rate.168 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Wong, supra note 22, at 379. 
 158. See, e.g., Historical Libor Rates, BBA, http://www.bbalibor.com/rates/ 
historical (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 159. See, e.g., Three Month Sterling (Short Sterling) Futures, NYSE EURONEXT 
GLOBAL DERIVATIVES, 
https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/contract/content/29101/contract-specification (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2013); Six-Month Euroyen LIBOR Futures, TOKYO FIN. EXCH. INC., 
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 160. Wong, supra note 22, at 379. 
 161. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4. 
 162. See McNulty, supra note 21. 
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 165. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §§ 4.12–4.13. 
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b. Lack of Authority 
The BBA is a non-profit organization.169  If banks deliberately lie 
or mislead investors, the BBA has no real authority to impose sanctions 
or penalties.170  The only way the BBA can punish banks is to publicly 
humiliate them.171  Accordingly, banks have little to fear of being caught 
manipulating LIBOR.172 
B. WHEATLEY REVIEW 
In September 2012, the Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report 
was published.173  This review represents U.K. regulators’ response to 
the LIBOR scandal.174  The review also included suggestions on how to 
strengthen LIBOR.175  On October 17, 2012, the U.K. Parliament 
announced that it planned to adopt the Wheatley Review suggestions.176  
Similarly, the BBA announced that it accepted the Wheatley Review 
and plans to implement its suggestions.177 
1. A New Institution 
The BBA acts as a lobbying group for the same banks submitting 
LIBOR quotes.178  In 2008, when the BBA CEO Angela Knight 
expressed hesitation over the BBA’s role in monitoring LIBOR and 
suggested selling the benchmark, panel banks vetoed the BBA’s 
suggestion.179  Recognizing this inherent conflict of interest, the 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 1.2. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. HM TREASURY, WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, WHEATLEY REVIEW OF 
LIBOR (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
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 177. See BBA, STRENGTHENING LIBOR, supra note 98. 
 178. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 3.2 
 179. Enrich & Colchester, supra note 36; see also Philip Stafford, Thomson Reuters 
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Wheatley Review stated that the BBA is not the proper authority to 
govern LIBOR and another institution should take on the BBA’s current 
role in governing LIBOR.180 
In addition, to further protect LIBOR, the new institution should 
create an independent oversight committee that represents a cross-
section of all users, or industry bodies that represent users, of LIBOR.181  
This committee, similar to the independent committees of corporate 
boards, would ensure the integrity of the new institution and report 
major infractions to the Financial Service Authority (“FSA”).182  The 
committee would also have the authority to enforce low-level infractions 
such as operating problems.183 
2. Regulatory Overview of the New Institution 
Currently, there is no direct regulatory scheme over LIBOR.184  All 
government-related actions are being pursued in the context of other 
regulatory frameworks.185  This results in insufficient oversight of 
LIBOR.186  Accordingly, there needs to be a regulatory body overseeing 
LIBOR.187  The review assumes that the FSA would be the appropriate 
regulatory body.188 
The report notes that increasing regulation may increase costs on 
banks.189  However, due to LIBOR’s importance, it is appropriate that 
these costs be implemented.190  Moreover, once LIBOR is fixed, banks 
will want to join because they get “prestige.”191  The regulatory cost is 
further justified by the protection these new regulations provide the 
public.192 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. §§ 3.2–3.5. 
 181. Id. § 3.36. 
 182. Id. § 3.35. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. § 2.4. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. § 2.5. 
 188. See id. §§ 2.6–2.7. 
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3. Extension of Civil Actions 
Currently, civil suits protect consumers from abusive financial 
instruments and products.193  Such suits, however, do not protect 
consumers from benchmark manipulations.194  Therefore, to protect 
consumers, the right to initiate civil suits against banks should be 
extended to include charges of fraudulently manipulating benchmarks.195 
4. Abolishing Rates 
Of the 150 published LIBOR rates prior to 2013, most were only 
thinly traded.196  In some currencies, market participants preferred 
domestic benchmarks to LIBOR.197  To ensure LIBOR’s accuracy, the 
Wheatley Review suggested that the new institution should stop 
compiling data for 130 rates.198 
5. Hiding Individual Banks’ Data 
Individual bank submissions are currently published alongside 
overall LIBOR rates.199  In an effort to promote a more accurate rate, the 
BBA debated only publishing the overall LIBOR rates and keeping 
individual bank submissions secret for a length of time.200  Ultimately, 
the BBA rejected this proposal and continued to publish individual bank 
rates.201 This policy led to banks submitting false rates so that market 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See id. § 2.30. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. § 2.31. 
 196. See id. § 5.5 (namely, the USD, Pound Sterling, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen and 
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 197. Id. § 5.6. 
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participants would not perceive them as less creditworthy than their 
peers.202 
According to the Wheatley Review, banks can assume that their 
peers’ rates do not significantly change on a daily basis.203  Banks can 
then estimate how their submission will impact the overall LIBOR rate 
and deliberately exclude their quote.204  Therefore, the Wheatley Review 
recommends that individual banks keep their rates secret for three 
months before they are published.205  This will allow banks not to worry 
about day-to-day trading, and discourage rate manipulations.206 
6. Increasing the Size of the LIBOR Panel 
All banks and a large number of market participants enjoy the 
benefits of LIBOR.207  Yet, only a small number of banks actually 
contribute to the benchmark.208  Some large banks, in particular, are 
notably absent from LIBOR panels.209 
Increasing panel sizes will have two major effects.210  First, larger 
panels will ensure that individual banks’ submissions have less of an 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See supra notes 76–92 and accompanying text. 
 203. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.15. 
 204. See id. § 5.15. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. § 5.22. 
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effect on the overall LIBOR rate.211  Second, by increasing the number 
of panel members, LIBOR will be more representative of banks as a 
whole.212  The Wheatley Review concludes that international authorities 
should encourage participation in LIBOR panels.213 
The Wheatley Review goes further to state that if banks want to 
leave their panels, or if panel sizes do not naturally increase, it might be 
necessary to compel individual banks to participate in LIBOR panels 
and pay the associated costs.214  This can be achieved through 
international agreements where banks must participate in LIBOR if they 
want to join inter-bank money markets.215  This sharply contrasts with 
the BBA’s voluntary approach.216 
7. Records 
Currently, panel banks do not have to keep records of their trade 
data.217  This makes it difficult to determine if banks’ quotes accurately 
reflect their cost of borrowing.218  To ensure LIBOR’s accuracy, banks 
should be required to keep records of their real-life trades.219  By 
comparing post hoc the quotes submitted by banks and the rates that the 
banks actually paid, the new institution will be able to ensure that banks 
are accurately reporting their cost of borrowing.220 
8. Separating Banks’ Trading and Cash Desks 
Similar to the BBA report, the Wheatley Review states that traders 
should be provided with training describing what types of contacts with 
a LIBOR submitter are proper.221  To ensure that improper contacts do 
                                                                                                                 
panel sizes, market participants may assume that LIBOR is “more accurate” when in 
reality LIBOR is just measuring a different benchmark. See id. §§ 8.1–8.7. 
 211. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.23. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. § 5.24.  The Report, however, gives no criteria on how new banks should be 
selected to join LIBOR. 
 214. See id. § 5.27. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See supra notes 107–111. 
 217. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 4.24. 
 218. See id. §§ 4.24–4.25. 
 219. Id. § 4.25. 
 220. Id. § 4.26. 
 221. Id. § 4.20. 
2014] LIBOR: THE CLEARINGHOUSE AND  479 
EXCHANGE BASED SOLUTION 
 
not take place, banks should be required to keep records of any contact 
between their traders and their cash desk.222  Separating the two 
departments makes it less likely that banks will submit false rates.223 
9. The Effect on Existing Contracts 
The Wheatley Review briefly addressed the effects its 
recommendations would have on existing contracts.224  Most swaps that 
are tied to LIBOR contain provisions in the event a fixing is 
unavailable.225  Such provisions were inserted into contracts with the 
understanding that something may disrupt market operations and 
prevent the BBA from publishing a daily LIBOR rate.226  Most of these 
provisions revolve around contract holders contacting a series of 
reference banks for inter-bank quotes and then averaging the 
results.227This approach, however, is unworkable.228  Due to the sheer 
volume of contracts that reference LIBOR, it is impractical for every 
party in a contract to contact multiple banks.229  Moreover, many of the 
reference banks used to determine this provision rate are the same banks 
that participate in LIBOR panels.230  If LIBOR panel banks are 
submitting false rates to the BBA, it seems likely they would submit 
false rates to individuals who contact them and ask for sensitive trading 
information.231 
C. ALTERNATIVES TO LIBOR 
Many commentators discuss using alternative benchmarks to 
LIBOR.232  Unfortunately, there appears to be no obvious 
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replacement.233  No single substitute can replace all of LIBOR’s uses, 
and it appears that there is some market inertia involved with using 
LIBOR.234  This Part will describe the characteristics of an ideal 
benchmark.  It will then describe some of the challenges in crafting a 
new benchmark.  Finally, this Part will briefly explore some of the more 
commonly cited LIBOR alternatives. 
1. The Ideal Benchmark 
An ideal benchmark is fair, accurate, and available to market 
participants in non-discriminatory commercial terms.235  Unfortunately, 
different types of benchmarks have different vulnerabilities.236  
Transaction based benchmarks can be manipulated by market 
participants in the underlying market, and survey based benchmarks are 
vulnerable to inaccurate submission.237 
The ownership and distribution of benchmarked data can also 
potentially make a benchmark unfair to some market participants.238  For 
example, if a benchmark is the intellectual property of an individual, 
organization, or company, the owner of the benchmark may only allow 
select individuals access to the information.239  The benchmark’s owner 
may also charge prohibitive fees for access to the information.240 
A credible benchmark has several key characteristics.241  First, the 
benchmark must be representative of the underlying market.242  Second, 
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the institution administering the benchmark must publish transparent 
rules describing the methodology it uses to calculate the benchmark.243  
Third, the organization must provide the benchmark in a fair and non-
discriminatory way to all market participants.244  Finally, the benchmark 
must be subject to credible oversight that prevents manipulation.245 
2. Domestic U.S. Dollar Benchmark 
LIBOR is based on Eurodollars, not U.S. dollars.246  This may be 
causing U.S. borrowers to pay a premium on their loans so that foreign 
banks have access to U.S. dollars.247  If there were an accurate 
benchmark measuring inter-bank loans between U.S. banks, loans based 
upon this benchmark would, most likely, more accurately reflect the true 
cost of borrowing in the United States.248  Accordingly, any LIBOR 
alternative should be based on U.S. Dollars.249 
3. Regulation 
Whatever new benchmark is proposed, it needs to be regulated to 
avoid manipulation by insiders and banks.250  These regulations should 
be comprehensive and include criminal, along with civil penalties for 
intentional violations.251  The extent of how the new benchmark should 
be regulated will depend on the method for calculating the new 
benchmark.252 
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4. The New York Funding Rate Fiasco 
In 2008, amid public outrage surrounding possible LIBOR rate 
manipulation, ICAP, a competitor of BBA, launched the New York 
Funding Rate (“NYFR”).253  As conceived, the NYFR was a new 
benchmark reflecting what it costs to borrow U.S. dollars in the United 
States.254  To provide an accurate benchmark, the NYFR intended to 
have a large panel consisting of 35 to 50 banks, and it would include 
other sources of funding that are not covered by LIBOR.255  
Furthermore, the new benchmark would only include 1-month and 3-
month tenors, and it would require a minimum of 24 participants to set a 
rate each day.256 
In the first four months following the NYFR’s inception, the 
average LIBOR-NYFR spread was 1.4 basis points.257  After Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, the LIBOR-NYFR spread widened, with the NYFR 
averaging 40 basis points above LIBOR.258  Throughout its history, the 
NYFR was above LIBOR every day, except for five days.259 
The NYFR’s life as a benchmark, however, was short lived.260  The 
original requirement of 24 participants was reduced to 16, and then 
again to 12.261  Finally, in 2012, ICAP announced it was discontinuing 
the NYFR due to a lack of participation.262 
The lesson from the NYFR is that without widespread market 
acceptance, any LIBOR alternative will be difficult to implement.263  
Regulators cannot force market participants to use a given benchmark 
when drafting contracts.264  In addition, market participants may be used 
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to using LIBOR, and wish to continue using the benchmark even though 
they know it is flawed and filled with self-manipulating banks.265 
5. Regulatory Arbitrage 
While laws can be passed requiring banks to participate in a 
benchmark, there may be significant opposition from banks.266  This 
might lead to banks conducting their financing needs abroad and away 
from U.S. regulators.267  Without any financial gain, banks may not 
voluntary agree to participate in any benchmark.268 
6. Effective Federal Fund Rate 
Banks are required to keep minimum reserves with the Federal 
Reserve.269  Bank reserves are based on a 14 day average,270 and banks 
borrow funds from each other in order maintain their minimum deposit 
requirements.271  Two banks that engage in a transaction report their 
trade to the Federal Reserve, which transfers the funds from the lending 
bank’s account to the borrowing bank’s account.272  At the end of the 
day, the Federal Reserve averages the day’s trades and compiles the data 
into the effective federal fund rate, or the rate that banks lend each other 
unsecured overnight funds in the U.S.273  Since the effective federal fund 
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rate is an accurate measure for unsecured overnight loans, it may be an 
appropriate substitute for some of LIBOR uses.274 
The effective federal fund rate, however, only measures overnight 
rates and does not measure longer tenors.275  Furthermore, the Federal 
Reserve’s decision regarding interest payments on deposits276 has had a 
bigger effect on the effective federal fund rate than the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers.277 The Federal Reserve has also indicted that may 
manipulate for economic reasons interest payouts.278  Accordingly, the 
effective federal fund rate is an inadequate LIBOR alternative.279 
7. OIS Swaps 
Another possible LIBOR alternative is overnight index swaps 
(“OIS”).280  These swaps are essentially long-term bets on the direction 
of the effective federal fund rate that contract holders pay, or get paid, 
based upon the difference between the effective federal fund rate and a 
set interest rate.281  Market participants generally use these swaps to 
extrapolate the effective federal fund rate beyond overnight tenors,282 
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and LCH.Clearnet, a large central clearing party, started using OIS 
swaps as an alternative at the end of 2010.283 
A disadvantage to OIS swaps is that because the notional amount, 
or underlying funds, does not change hands, contract holders’ risks are 
capped at an interest rate.284  In contrast, LIBOR transactions are real 
loans where the underlying funds trade hands.285  This leads to there 
being less credit risk in an OIS swap than a LIBOR loan.286 
Another disadvantage to using OIS swaps as a LIBOR alternative is 
the lack of a widely acceptable standard.287  Prior to 2013, OIS swaps 
were over-the-counter trades with little regulation.288  As of the 
beginning of 2013, there is no market-acceptable rate for these swaps.289  
Therefore, OIS swaps are ultimately not effective alternatives to all 
LIBOR contracts.290 
8. Treasury Bonds 
Instead of using LIBOR as a benchmark, market participants may 
be able to use treasury notes as a benchmark.291  Treasury notes are 
readily traded and there is an existing market for such notes.292  In 
theory, U.S. treasury notes are not risk free.293  In practice, however, 
market participants treat treasury notes as secured.294  This leads to 
investors purchasing treasury notes to avoid market risks.295  During the 
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2008 financial crisis, treasury bonds were even negative at one point.296  
Institutional investors, so fearful of depositing money in banks, were 
willing to pay the government to safely hold their money.297  Due to this 
excess liquidity and safety net, treasury notes do not accurately reflect 
borrowing costs, and thus are not ideal substitutes for LIBOR.298 
9. Exchange Based 
When attempting to sell or buy a security, investors use exchanges 
to find a counterparty.299  When the two parties agree on a price, the 
exchange acts as a clearing system and the parties give the exchange 
their security and payment. 300 The exchange then executes the trade and 
transfers the security and its payment to its new owners. 301 
Tabb and Grundfest propose creating a bank exchange where banks 
can exchange inter-bank loans.302  Then, by recording all loans and 
weighing for transaction size, an effective benchmark can be created.303  
Furthermore, even when there is low volatility, by dividing the bid-ask 
spread, a rate can be obtained.304 
To ensure the benchmark’s accuracy, all bid and ask prices must be 
“committed” (i.e., banks must commit themselves to go through with 
such transaction).305  Alternatively, banks can be required to borrow or 
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lend at their quoted rates to a central fund.306  The central fund can then 
use the proceeds from the bid-ask spread to pay for itself.307 
III. CLEARINGHOUSE, EXCHANGE AND HYBRID BASED SOLUTIONS 
Both the BBA and the Wheatley Review attempted to reform 
LIBOR.  The BBA was unsuccessful in its reforms, and the Wheatley 
Review, although a step in the right direction, is not enough.  Greater 
reform and regulation of LIBOR is needed.  Many of the alternatives 
discussed in Part III are viable for some of the many uses of LIBOR.  
Part III of this Comment will explore LIBOR alternatives that are not 
mentioned in Part II, but that may be appropriate for some contracts. 
A. CLEARINGHOUSE BASED 
Under 17 C.F.R. § 50, all FX and fixed-to-interest rate swaps must 
pass through a clearinghouse.308  The intent of 17 C.F.R. § 50 is to 
remove these swaps from the shadow banking system and allow them to 
be more closely regulated.309 However, the effect of 17 C.F.R. § 50 is 
that all long-term LIBOR based swaps pass through a clearinghouse.310 
Similarly, in order for banks to maintain minimum reserve 
requirements, banks report overnight loans to the Federal Reserve.311  
The central bank then transfers funds from between the two banks’ 
accounts and effectively acts as a clearinghouse.312  A similar 
clearinghouse approach can also work for LIBOR. 
Regulations can be adopted requiring all U.S. inter-bank loans to 
pass through a clearinghouse.313  The clearinghouse can then calculate 
the average interest rate, while weighing for loan size.314  The 
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clearinghouse system can then effectively measure interbank loans.315  
This average can then be published as a LIBOR substitute. 
Since any benchmark derived through this method is based on 
actual trades, and not theoretical trades, such a benchmark would 
accurately reflect banks’ true costs of borrowing.316  Furthermore, 
because such a proposal measures U.S. trading and not EuroDollar 
trading, it would more accurately reflect borrowing in the United 
States.317  In addition, the USD LIBOR panel, under the BBA, is 
comprised of only 18 banks, many of which are non-U.S. banks.318  
Requiring all domestic banks to lend and borrow through a 
clearinghouse would produce a much larger sample size, thereby 
increasing the benchmark’s accuracy.319 
As the NYFR fiasco showed, however, without a reward, banks 
have little incentive to report their private data.320  If banks wanting to 
borrow funds must report their transaction data, they might find it easier 
to not borrow at all, or simply borrow overseas and avoid reporting 
requirements.321  Banks also might only offer to lend at ridiculous 
rates.322 
B. EXCHANGE BASED 
Under Tabb and Grundfest’s proposal, all banks must limit their 
trading to an exchange.323  A major flaw with this proposal, however, is 
that it does not take into account a bank’s credit-worthiness.324  Some 
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banks are more credit-worthy than others and should be able to borrow 
at better rates than their peers.325  By forcing banks to lend on an 
exchange with participants who have various degrees of credit-
worthiness, banks will be forced to lend only at the rate at which it 
would lend to the least credit-worthy institution on the exchange.326  The 
end result is that the exchange would have few sellers and a number of 
strong banks overpaying for credit at the benefit of weaker banks.327 
A solution to such a problem could be to allow banks to choose 
who they are willing to lend to on the exchange.328  Similar to an open 
line of credit, each bank on the exchange can create  its own personal 
“rating” for the other banks on the exchange.329  This rating can be 
adjusted at will and is a reflection of the perceived credit risk of the 
borrowing bank by the lending bank.330  The rating bank then makes an 
offer where it agrees to lend funds to any bank that is above a prescribed 
credit rating.331  Banks below this credit rating will not receive an 
offer.332  The end result is that banks will only lend to other banks that 
they trust.333 
Ultimately, however, this approach may be overly burdensome on 
the market.334  Currently, by allowing open lines of credit with some 
banks and not others, banks are indirectly rating each other and choosing 
the most credit-worthy banks.335  Similarly, by choosing to lend to only 
some banks, or raising the cost of borrowing for other institutions, banks 
are further, albeit indirectly, rating each other.336  However, this “rating” 
is done either on a bank-by-bank basis or a loan-by-loan basis and is 
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market-led.337  To force banks to rate each other simply to create an 
exchange may be overly burdensome on the market.338 
C. HYBRID EXCHANGE 
The better approach may be a modified exchange that has some of 
the features of an exchange and some of the features of a 
clearinghouse.339  This hybrid exchange can have bids on specific tenors 
without any sellers.340  Buyers will simply state that they are looking to 
borrow funds at a certain rate.341  Other banks will then have the 
opportunity to lend to the buyer at the offered price.342 
Market economics dictate that banks would be more willing to lend 
to their most credit-worthy peers.343  The result is that less credit-worthy 
banks will have to offer to pay higher costs for credit that will be 
reflected in their bids.344  Because of this premium, banks will be willing 
to lend to their less credit-worthy peers.345  The end result is that the 
exchange will accurately depict U.S. interbank lending, and the trading 
data from the exchange can be volume weighted to create an accurate 
benchmark.346 
Such a proposal will avoid many of the pitfalls of the previous 
proposals and the Wheatley Review.347  Banks will receive a benefit in 
this system over the current system.  Lenders will compete with each 
other to give the borrower a better price, allowing borrowers to save 
money.  Similarly, by having more access to potential borrowers, 
lenders will also benefit from such a system.  The end result is that 
borrowers get better terms for their loans and lenders have more 
borrowers. 
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This proposal also avoids extensive regulation by a governing 
body.348  Similar to equity and commodity exchanges, the regulatory 
oversight will be limited to ensuring that the actual transactions take 
place and that there is no fraud in the marketplace.349  Since there is a 
counterparty to every trade, the party with the perceived advantage in 
the trade will want to ensure that the trade actually takes place.350  If the 
trade does not take place, the aggrieved party can report the violation to 
the appropriate regulatory body.351 
CONCLUSION 
Banks manipulated LIBOR for many years to benefit themselves.  
Despite getting creditable reports of such allegations, no comprehensive 
government action was taken.  In an attempt to reform LIBOR, the BBA 
and the Wheatley Review did a thorough job analyzing LIBOR.  
Ultimately, however, their recommendations are inadequate in the 
context of the U.S. market.  Although not perfect, a better LIBOR 
alternative may be provided through a clearinghouse or hybrid 
clearinghouse and exchange type system. 
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